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“When thou shalt besiege a city a long time . . . 
thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof” 1 
 
 
     he Gaza Strip is tucked between the southern border of Israel and the 
northern border of Egypt, with access to the Mediterranean Sea. Its legal 
status under international law changed in 2005, following the withdrawal of 
the Israeli army from the Strip as part of Israel’s disengagement plan.2 An 
official army proclamation announced “the end of martial law” once the Is-
raeli Defense Force had “left . . . the territories of the Gaza Strip, and trans-
ferred control over these territories into the hands of the Palestinian Coun-
cil.”3 The Strip thus shifted from being under occupation by the controlling 
armed forces to Palestinian governance, both de jure and de facto. Notwith-
standing various contentions against it,4 Israel’s position in this regard was 
confirmed by an Israeli Supreme Court ruling, which held that, under the 
terms of Israel’s disengagement plan, the Gaza Strip could no longer be said 
to be under Israeli occupation.5 What is more, alongside the termination of 
control, the Supreme Court ruled that Israel still carried various obligations 
toward the population of the Gaza Strip—namely, “basic obligations that 
 
1. Deuteronomy 20: 19. 
2. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION 211–24 (2d ed. 2012). 
3. IDF Commander of the Gaza Region, Proclamation Regarding the End of Martial 
Law (Gaza Region) No. 6 (2005), http://www.hamoked.org.il/items/7931.pdf (Hebrew). 
4. See infra note 6.  
5. HCJ 9132/07 Al-Bassiouni et al. v. Prime Minister et al., ¶ 12 (2008) (Isr.) (official 
English translation at https://tinyurl.com/2se4u63f) [hereinafter Al-Bassiouni case]. See also 
CrimA 6659/06 A & B v. State of Israel 62(4) PD 329, ¶ 11 (2007) (Isr.) (official English 
translation at https://tinyurl.com/9yy8pz9v):  
 
In such circumstances, where the State of Israel has no real ability to control what 
happens in the Gaza Strip in an effective manner, the Gaza Strip should not be 
regarded as a territory that is subject to belligerent occupation from the viewpoint 
of international law, even though the unique situation that prevails there imposes 
certain obligations on the State of Israel vis-à-vis the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip. 
  
For a comprehensive analysis of the treatment by the Israeli Supreme Court of the siege on 
Gaza, including petitions concerning the movement of individuals to and from the area, see 
DAVID KRETZMER & YAËL RONEN, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT 













apply to combatants engaged [in] armed conflict, [requiring] them to ensure 
the welfare of the civilian population and respect its dignity and basic 
rights.”6  
However, circumstances were complicated in 2007 by Hamas’ takeover 
of the Strip, when Israel consequently imposed a land siege on the area, add-
ing a naval blockade in 2009. Since then, the already-dire living conditions in 
the Strip have declined consistently, and the area’s dependence on external 
aid has grown. This is evidenced by various indicators: a deterioration in the 
quality of available drinking water, a rise in unemployment, and—now that 
some passage is allowed from the Gaza Strip into Egypt—sizable emigration 
out of the area.7  
Several political actors involved in the Gaza Strip arguably bear varying 
degrees of responsibility for these ongoing issues: the Hamas government, 
which controls the Strip and wages war against Israel; the Palestinian Au-
thority, which holds limited power over parts of the West Bank, pays the 
salaries of its officials in the Strip, and considers the area to be under its 
formal authority; neighboring Egypt, which manages one part of the Strip’s 
border; and, finally, Israel, which controls both its own terrestrial border with 
the Gaza Strip and the region’s airspace and territorial waters. But the mul-
tiplicity of agents that share responsibility for the plight of the Strip’s resi-
dents does not diminish Israel’s own obligations. As the Supreme Court 
ruled, and as I argue in this article, the end of its military presence inside the 
Strip has not released Israel of its obligations regarding certain aspects of 
Gazan welfare. This is due both to Israel’s ongoing control over the Strip’s 
borders, airspace, and territorial waters and to the area’s dependence on the 
external supply of basic living necessities.  
This article examines Israel’s basic obligations for the year 2021 and be-
yond, given that there is no end in sight for the years-long siege and blockade 
of the Gaza Strip. I will consider its obligations under three potentially rele-
vant legal frameworks: the law of occupation (Part II), international human-
itarian law (Part III), and human rights law (Part IV). From this assessment, 
distinct and overlapping legal duties that compel Israel to adjust its approach 
 
6. Al-Bassiouni case, supra note 5, ¶ 14.  
7. Daniel Estrin, “I Want To Get The Hell Out Of Here”: Thousands of Palestinians are Leaving 
Gaza, NPR (July 4, 2019, 5:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/04/733487137/i-want-
to-get-the-hell-out-of-here-thousands-of-palestinians-are-leaving-gaza; Ali Younes, Palestin-













to the Gaza Strip can be evinced. On this basis, I propose that the demands 
of the law on States that impose prolonged sieges and blockades be given a 
broader interpretation—one that manifests greater attention to human thriv-
ing, above and beyond the obligation to keep the besieged population alive.   
 
II. SIEGE, BLOCKADE, AND THE LAW OF OCCUPATION 
 
The position of the Israeli government and its Supreme Court—that the 
Gaza Strip is no longer occupied—has been severely criticized by several 
legal scholars who argue that Israel’s occupation in the Gaza Strip is still very 
much in effect.8 But, as I have maintained on various occasions,9 the appli-
cation of the legal framework of occupation to new issues that developed 
after Israel’s official disengagement, and independently of its historical occu-
pation, is untenable. In effect, the imposition of the law of occupation on 
the Gaza situation amounts to employing one legal category that was in-
tended to deal with a very specific problem to address an entirely different 
problem.10 It is not only categorically wrong. It is also unhelpful for identi-
fying Israel’s duties toward Gaza’s population: other, more appropriate, legal 
doctrines outline far clearer criteria.  
To elaborate: the law on occupation is intended to govern legal relation-
ships in the exceptional case where a foreign army exercises effective control 
outside of its own national territory without the consent of the local sover-
eign.11 That legal framework was tailored to govern the triangular relation-
ship formed between three actors: (a) the occupying army, (b) the civilian 
population in the occupied territory, and (c) the sovereign government tem-
porarily ousted from that territory and precluded from asserting its usual au-
thority there. It assumes effective control: its rules specify the criteria for 
 
8. See AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2017). 
9. Eyal Benvenisti, Responsibility for the Protection of Human Rights under the Interim Israeli-
Palestinian Agreements, 28 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 297 (1994); BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF OC-
CUPATION, supra note 2, at 211–12. Cf. Yuval Shany, Faraway, So Close: The Legal Status of 
Gaza after Israel’s Disengagement, 8 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
359, 379–83 (2005).  
10. For a compelling criticism of Gross’s functional approach, see Hanne Cuyckens, Is 
Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?, 63 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 275 
(2016). See also Roy Schöndorf & Eran Shamir-Borer, The (In)applicability of the Law of Occupa-
tion to the Gaza Strip, 43 TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 403 (2020) (Hebrew). 











determining the commencement and end of the occupation; lays out the ex-
tent and means of the occupant, which acts in place of (but unauthorized by) 
the legitimate government, to implement its authority; and details the occu-
pant’s duties with regard to maintaining public order, securing the local gov-
ernment’s assets, and preserving the local population’s welfare.12 I believe 
these requirements are rendered irrelevant where there is no direct rule. How 
can an army with no “boots on the ground” impose its authority on a pop-
ulation, regulate behavior, or maintain public order when it holds command 
over nothing but border crossings? 
That said, even if occupation technically terminated after Israel’s disen-
gagement from the Gaza Strip, one can argue that the laws of occupation 
still apply because they relate to actions that Israel took (or failed to take) 
during its official occupation from 1967 until 2005. As I wrote following the 
disengagement,13 the end of occupation did not entirely release Israel from 
its legal obligations because the prior decades of Israeli occupation produced 
 
12. Id. ch. 1; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCU-
PATION 1, 42–45, 91–94 (2d ed. 2019).  
13. Eyal Benvenisti, The Law on the Unilateral Termination of Occupation, in A WISER CEN-
TURY? JUDICIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, DISARMAMENT AND THE LAWS OF WAR 100 
YEARS AFTER THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 372 (Thomas Giegerich & Ur-
sula E. Heinz eds., 2009). For further support for the general argument that the end of 
occupation cannot promptly release the occupant from its obligations, see Benjamin Rubin, 
Disengagement from the Gaza Strip and Post-Occupation Duties, 42 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 528, 550–
58 (2009):  
 
A much sounder approach would be that the occupant should be able to disengage itself 
from its presence in the occupied area, but not from the responsibilities involved with its 
former standing as occupant. As long as the needs of the population persist, responsibility 
must be attached to the same entity that carried the responsibility for the territory during 
the occupation.  
Putting this burden on the former occupant follows the logic of the law of occupation. 
  
Id. at 550. See also NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NA-
TION BUILDING 80–81, 128–29 (2004); Ariel Zemach, What Are Israel’s Legal Obligations To-
wards the Gaza Population?, 12 MISHPAT U’MIMSHAL 83, 126–31 (2009) (Hebrew)] (Discuss-
ing and rejecting possible grounds for Israel’s responsibility toward the population in Gaza 
after the unilateral withdrawal); Yuval Shany, The Law Applicable to Non-Occupied Gaza: A 
Comment on Bassiouni v. The Prime Minister of Israel, 42 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW, 101, 109–16 
(2009) (acknowledging Israel’s obligation to care for the basic needs of the civilian popula-
tion under humanitarian law, in light of the historical dependence, the length of the occu-
pation, and Israel’s present control over the Gaza Strip’s borders, which confers continuing 











a multi-layered structural dependence of the Strip’s populace and govern-
ment. Thus, for example, most of the Strip’s civilian infrastructure and com-
munication services originate in Israel, and Israel also controls the region’s 
population registration.14 Given that the region’s dependence resulted di-
rectly from Israel’s control and that Israel’s disengagement from the Strip 
was a voluntary, unilateral act, I hold that this enduring dependence must be 
analyzed in light of the law of occupation. More specifically, I hold that an 
occupant’s obligation to “restore and ensure” public order and civilian life 
in the territory it occupies15 should not apply exclusively to the duration of 
the occupation but should extend beyond the occupant’s abrupt decision to 
pull out and leave the previously-occupied population without adequate 
sources of employment, functioning health and education systems, and other 
critical public services.16 The meaning and scope of the obligations that 
bound Israel during its lengthy occupation of the Gaza Strip should there-
fore be developed, continuing until satisfactory services are offered within 
the Strip.17 These include the obligation to supply electricity and water and 
to ensure access to Israeli hospitals. But discussing Israel’s responsibility to-
day in terms of the law of occupation—invoking issues caused by its occu-
pation years ago, prior to its disengagement—does not resolve the subse-
quent questions that arose post-disengagement. These mostly concern the 
restrictions that Israel put on the Gaza Strip’s civilian population to under-
mine—either directly or indirectly—the military capacity of its enemy oper-
ating in the Strip.  
The COVID-19 pandemic put these issues under the spotlight. Follow-
ing the outbreak of the virus, Israel facilitated the delivery of medical supplies 
 
14. SARI BASHI & TAMAR FELDMAN, SCALE OF CONTROL: ISRAEL’S CONTINUED RE-
SPONSIBILITY IN THE GAZA STRIP 17–25 (2011), https://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/scaleof 
control/scaleofcontrol_en.pdf. 
15. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations] (“The authority of the legitimate 
power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the 
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” (emphasis added)). 
16. BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 2, at 7–8; Rubin, supra note 13, 
at 559–63.  
17. BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 2, at 86–89; Rubin, supra note 











to Gaza (largely donated by international organizations),18 including vac-
cines;19 organized professional training for Gazan medical staff in Israel20 in 
coordination with Hamas;21 and, for a brief period, facilitated the testing of 
Gazan residents’ samples in Israeli hospitals.22 But, at the same time, Israel 
also tightened movement restrictions on Palestinians wishing to leave the 
Gaza Strip, ostensibly to prevent the spread of the virus.23 Such restrictions 
on the passage of goods and people do not fall clearly within the ambit of 
the law of occupation.24 Rather, first and foremost, the passage of goods and 
people is regulated by different rules in humanitarian law and human rights 









18. Israel Defense Forces, Israelis and Palestinians Fight COVID-19 Together (updated July 
8, 2020), https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/idfs-response-to-covid-19/israelis-and-palestini-
ans-fight-covid-19-together/. 
19. Eyal Benvenisti, Israel Is Legally Obligated to Ensure the Population in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip Are Vaccinated, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 7409 
1/israel-is-legally-obligated-to-ensure-the-population-in-the-west-bank-and-gaza-strip-are-
vaccinated/. 
20. Times of Israel Staff, Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, Gaza Medics Trained by Israeli Teams 
– Report, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Apr. 11, 2020, 4:02 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/amid-
coronavirus-pandemic-gaza-medics-trained-by-israeli-teams-report/. 
21. Joanne Serrieh, Hamas Coordinates Coronavirus Trainings for Gaza Doctors, Nurses in Is-
rael: Reports, ALARABIYA NEWS (May 1, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://english.alarabiya.net/cor 
onavirus/2020/05/01/Hamas-coordinates-coronavirus-trainings-for-Gaza-doctors-nurses 
-in-Israel-Reports. 
22. Jerusalem Post Staff, IDF Halts Coronavirus Testing in Gaza, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 
22, 2020, 09:29 AM), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/idf-halts-coronavirus-testing-in-
gaza-625446. 
23. Closure Policy Regarding the Entry of Residents of the Gaza Strip into Israel and Judea and 
Samaria, GOV.IL (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/en-
try_to_gaza (Hebrew); Adam Rasgon & Iyad Abuheweila, Coronavirus Spares Gaza, but Travel 
Restrictions Do Not, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
08/08/world/middleeast/coronavirus-gaza.html. 











III. PROLONGED SIEGE AND BLOCKADE IN INTERNATIONAL             
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
A. Applicability of the Laws of Siege and Blockade 
 
Since Hamas’ 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip, Israel has maintained a land 
siege on the Strip (calling it a “lockdown”).25 It placed restrictions to control 
both the outflow and inflow of people and goods, with changing schedules 
calculated to put pressure on Hamas.26 We must remember that a siege is an 
act of war whose usual purpose is to defeat the enemy’s military forces;27 this 
reasoning applies to the present siege as well.28  
The classic definition of a siege refers to a complete enclosure of the 
besieged enemy.29 In this case, while Israel’s control over the land borders 
of the Gaza Strip still leaves the local population with an outlet to Egypt 
through the Rafah Border Crossing, the effective coordination between the 
two countries (excluding a short period when the Muslim Brotherhood ruled 
Egypt) enables, in practice, the prevention of any passage of people and 
 
25. BASHI & FELDMAN, supra note 14, at 11–12; 1 JACOB TURKEL ET AL., THE PUBLIC 
COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010, ¶¶ 48–50 (2011), 
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/downloads_eng1/en/ENG_turkel_eng_a. 
pdf [hereinafter 1 TURKEL REPORT]. 
26. Shany, Faraway, So Close, supra note 9, at 369, 373; Mustafa Mari, The Israeli Disengage-
ment from the Gaza Strip: An End of the Occupation?, 8 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 356, 366 (2005).  
27. James Kraska, Siege, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ¶ 1, https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-97801992 
31690-e407?rskey=h3p7UC&result=1&prd=OPIL (last updated Dec. 2009) (“Siege war-
fare is an operational strategy to facilitate capture of a fortified place”). 
28. This is why Dinstein is willing to examine the Gaza Strip as if it were under occu-
pation. See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 12, at 299–300; Shany, The 
Law Applicable to Non-Occupied Gaza, supra note 13, at 106–10. 
29. Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Sieges, the Law and Protecting Civilians, CHATHAM HOUSE 
3 (June 27, 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/re-
search/2019-06-27-Sieges-Protecting-Civilians_0.pdf:  
 
The essence of siege operations is the isolation of besieged enemy forces in terms of their 
separation from reinforcements and logistical supplies. There is no need for total encircle-
ment. What matters is the effect of the positioning of the besieging forces. They must be in 
a position to control entry and egress from a particular area, and thus movement in and out 
of weapons and ammunition, supplies and people. 
  
See also Sean Watts, Humanitarian Logic and the Law of Siege: A Study of the Oxford Guidance on 











goods. This creates a siege regime under the joint responsibility—together 
and separately—of both countries.30 
Since 2009, Israel has also imposed a naval blockade on the Gaza Strip.31 
A naval blockade is an act of war that prevents the passage of ships and 
aircraft, hostile or neutral, to and from seaports, airports, and any area adja-
cent to the enemy-controlled shoreline.32 The laws of naval warfare allow a 
besieging power to capture ships threatening to break a blockade and also to 
attack ships resisting capture after being forewarned.33 In practice, the Gaza 
Strip blockade also enforces limitations on fishing and prevents any entry or 
exit of goods and people by sea.  
 
B. The Narrow Framework of the Laws of Siege and Naval Blockade  
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) prescribes the role of siege and block-
ade on land and at sea, permitting their use to reduce an enemy to starvation 
until it surrenders.34 More generally, as an act of war,35 the siege and the 
 
30. See, e.g., 1 TURKEL REPORT, supra note 25, ¶ 64 (“Egypt did indeed impose re-
strictions on movement at the Rafah crossing,” and therefore “the humanitarian effect on 
the Gaza Strip between the naval blockade and the land crossings policy” remained un-
changed.). 
31. As the Turkel Commission wrote, Israel enforces its blockade all along the Gaza 
Strip’s naval border. See 1 TURKEL REPORT, supra note 25, ¶¶ 48–50; GEOFFREY PALMER 
ET AL., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S PANEL OF INQUIRY ON THE 31 MAY 2010 
FLOTILLA INCIDENT 39–41 (2011), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resour 
ces/Full_Report_2235.pdf [hereinafter PALMER REPORT]. 
32. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 257 (3d ed. 2016); Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, 
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, https://opil.ou-
plaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e252?rskey=ycH8 
lD&result=1&prd=MPIL (last updated Oct. 2015). 
33. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CON-
FLICTS AT SEA ¶ 98 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).  
34. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 32, at 255–56; Kraska, supra note 
27.  
35. The comparison between bombardment and siege is already made in the Hague 
Regulations, supra note 15, art. 27:  
 
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, 
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, 
hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being 
used at the time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence 












blockade are subject to the fundamental principles36 of land and naval war-
fare,37 which aim to ensure that attacks are limited to military targets38 and 
that they avoid excessive collateral damage to civilians.39 For example, a siege 
cannot continue once the besieged announce their intent to surrender if the 
sole purpose of continuing is to prolong unnecessary suffering. Similarly, 
laying siege to a large civilian population harboring a small and insignificant 
military force without weighing other options may be excessive and there-
fore forbidden. The obligation that the blockading party avoid excessive in-
jury to non-combatants also arises from specific prescriptions in the laws of 
 
36. On the role of custom in the principle of proportionality, see DINSTEIN, CONDUCT 
OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 32, at 138 (Dinstein noting that, according to the general (cus-
tomary law) principle of proportionality, “the expected injury to civilians in the wake of a 
blockade [must not] be ‘excessive’ in relation to the military advantage anticipated.”). See also 
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 33, ¶ 102. 
37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (applies this distinction to attacks from the sea as well: 
“The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the 
civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all 
attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land.”). 
38. Id. art. 52:  
 
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. . . . 2. Attacks shall be 
limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives 
are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutraliza-
tion, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
 
39. Id. art. 51(5)(b) (“an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”). For the 
principle of proportionality as a general principle of the law of armed conflict, see Jan 
Kleffner, Military Collaterals and Ius in Bello Proportionality, 48 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 43 (2018). For the application of the principle of proportionality to the naval block-
ade of Gaza, see PALMER REPORT, supra note 31; 1 TURKEL REPORT, supra note 25, ¶¶ 87–
94; Douglas Guilfoyle, The Mavi Marmara Incident and Blockade in Armed Conflict, 81 BRITISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 197–204 (2011); Andrew Sanger, The Contempo-
rary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 397, 414 (2010); PHILLIP DREW, THE LAW OF MARITIME BLOCKADE: 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 107–10 (2017); Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockades and 
Interdictions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
925, 932–33 (Marc Weller ed., 2015); Russell Buchan, The International Law of Naval Blockade 
and Israel’s Interception of the Mavi Marmara, 58 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW RE-











blockade40 and from rules establishing the obligation to allow humanitarian 
passage.41 The prohibition dates back to ancient custom and was recognized 
by Grotius, who, in turn, relied on the biblical phrase proscribing the de-
struction of trees in a besieged area.42 What is more, Israel has acknowledged 
such obligations in the context of border crossings.43  
Obligations toward besieged populations are narrowly defined in the 
laws of blockade and are limited to the issue of starvation. Under ordinary 
circumstances, blockades are expected to end when food and water supplies 
grow scarce. Consequently, the Turkel Commission,44 in considering, inter 
alia, whether the Gaza blockade was legal, determined that the issues of 
“damage” and “injury” under international human rights law were primarily 
concerned with starvation and the denial of essential supplies. It thus con-
cluded that—as the naval blockade did not cause starvation in the Gaza Strip 
and Israel did not thwart the passage of medical supplies and other essentials 
for the survival of the civilian population, such as water—Israel had met its 
obligations under international law.45 Accordingly, both the siege and block-
ade could be considered legal. 
 
40. Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 54; regarding naval blockades, see SAN REMO MAN-
UAL, supra note 33, ¶¶ 103–4.  
41. Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 70; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 23, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. See 
also DAPO AKANDE & EMANUELA-CHIARA GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE ON THE LAW 
RELATING TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT 
(2016). For a criticism, see Watts, supra note 29, at 33–43.  
42. “When thou shalt besiege a city . . . thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof.” Deu-
teronomy 20, 19. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE bk.3 ch. XII (A.C. 
Campbell trans., M. Walter Dunne 1901) (1625) (citing the biblical verse (Parashat Shoftim 
[Judges]). The rationale—“for the tree of the field is man’s life . . . Only the trees which 
thou knowest that they be not trees for meat, thou shalt destroy and cut them down”—
serves Hugo Grotius to justify the principle of proportionality in sieges. Grotius notes that 
“the divine law has an eye, in ordering wild trees to be made use of for the construction of 
works in a siege, while fruit-trees, and every thing necessary for the support of man, ought, 
if possible, to be spared.” On the influences of Jewish law on Grotius, see Ivan Berkowitz, 
Grotius and the Rabbinic Interpretation of Natural Law (paper on file with author, 2020).  
43. Al-Bassiouni case, supra note 5, ¶ 14.  
44. The Turkel Commission was established in 2010 by the Israeli government, follow-
ing the naval incident that occurred on May 31 of the same year. In that incident, the Israeli 
army captured ships that were making their way from Turkey to the Gaza Strip as part of a 
flotilla explicitly aimed at breaking Israel’s naval blockade. The Commission was charged 
with investigating, inter alia, how the naval blockade could be reconciled with the principles 
of international law. 











However, the laws of siege and blockade could be interpreted as requir-
ing that the besieging party allow civilians to exit the besieged area.46 Such 
an interpretation would highlight the problems with Israel’s naval blockade.47 
Additionally, some have criticized the Turkel Commission’s findings, argu-
ing that considering the sufficiency of the foodstuffs provided alone was 
insufficient: the cultural and religious needs of the local population, requiring 
certain foods and avoiding others (e.g., kosher food, or halal in the case of 
the Gaza Strip) should also be taken into account.48 This is an important 
discussion, of course, but it relates to only one small aspect of the totality of 
human needs that the laws governing siege and blockade should consider.  
The laws of siege and blockade as set out above were developed in the 
context of historical wars, where a siege or blockade might last weeks or 
months and where besiegers would aim for some sort of resolution during 
longer blockades.49 These laws never envisioned such long-term sieges, span-
ning almost a generation. This sort of siege and blockade raises different 
issues beyond the basic, existential ones. Should locked-in civilians be al-
lowed, for example, to leave the besieged area for the purposes of family 
unification? Do these civilians have the right to pursue opportunities beyond 
that territory, such as education and work, cultural, or athletic aspirations? 
Do the laws of war allow the besieging party to deny people such basic hu-
man needs, to starve them out socially and culturally, on the premise that 
they are keeping them alive with basic supplies? Ultimately, people under 
such siege and blockade suffer many profound effects of confinement, be-
coming stunted as they are unable to develop their personalities and potential 
to the full and pursue their goals in life—indefinitely. This narrow, intermi-
nable application of the laws of siege and blockade, based on a tightly-de-
fined obligation to supply food and water, amounts to inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment, for it ignores the human need to flourish and views people as 
 
46. See Gillard, supra note 29, at 11 (“evacuations of civilians from besieged areas are a 
way of giving effect to the general obligation in the conduct of military operations to take 
constant care to spare the civilian population”). 
47. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 32, at 253–57. 
48. Aeyal Gross & Tamar Feldman, We Didn’t Want to Hear the Word Calories, 33 BERK-
LEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 379 (2015). 
49. The German siege of Leningrad lasted three and a half years. The eighteenth century 











creatures whose basic needs comprise of nothing more than food and wa-
ter.50 
The Turkel Commission was not indifferent to such considerations. 
When it started its work—about two years into the blockade—the blockade 
showed no signs of ending. In a spirit of cautiousness and sensitivity, it 
turned to consider “the overall humanitarian cost of Israel’s economic war-
fare”51 and expressed concern over the “real danger that the longer [the siege 
lasts], systemic damage to the economy will result.”52 Ten years on, this con-
cern has naturally intensified, extending beyond the economic aspects to the 
various basic personal, human, and social needs that are excessively compro-
mised by the blockade’s continuation. As I describe in the next part of this 
article, the laws of siege and blockade, especially in the long run, must weigh 
against the military purpose of the blockade the full scope of damage—
whether direct or collateral—suffered by the civilian population.  
 
C. The Laws of Prolonged Siege and Blockade: The Legal Ramifications of Time 
 
Just as the law of occupation was originally conceived for short-term 
measures—arising between the end of fighting and a peace treaty, to be 
signed within weeks or months—the laws of blockade were developed ac-
cording to similar expectations.53 And, just as the changing reality of pro-
longed occupations necessitated the adjustment of relevant laws (extending 
an occupant’s obligations beyond the bare necessities and specifying more 
 
50. On this issue, see Michal Luft, Living in a Legal Vacuum: The Case of Israel’s Legal 
Position and Policy towards Gaza Residents, 51 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 193, 224–32 (2018) (criti-
cizing, in light of the Al-Bassiouni case, the narrow conception of Israel’s obligations toward 
the civilian population of the Gaza Strip, which leaves the latter in a legal vacuum with 
insufficient protection of their rights). 
51. 1 TURKEL REPORT, supra note 25, ¶ 91.  
52. Id.  
53. For the idea that the laws of occupation assume a relatively short period of foreign 
control, see BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 2, at 20 (“Occupation was 
conceived of as a temporary regime existing until the conclusion of a peace agreement be-
tween the enemy sides (unless the defeated party ceased to exist as a result of the war, a 
situation referred to as debellatio).”). For the idea that the laws of siege are temporary, and 
for a historical review, see DREW, supra note 39. The short-term nature of naval blockades 
is also attested by the requirement that the besieging party specify the “duration” of its 











comprehensive duties, in keeping with changing circumstances),54 so too is 
an adjustment required for cases of prolonged siege and blockade. Under the 
approach I propose, as time passes, a besieging party would be required to 
reexamine the proportionality of the broadening range of limitations set on 
the civilian population (such as limitations on schoolbooks, internet access, 
supplies for agriculture and industry, family unifications, and travel for med-
ical treatment or studies abroad).  
Additionally, as with prolonged occupation,55 the besieging or blockad-
ing party must continuously reassess the justification for continuing its siege 
or blockade, to ease it, or to stop it altogether. The short-term purpose of 
the decisive defeat of combatants might justify collateral damage to 
non-combatants. However, prolonged sieges and blockades raise the ques-
tion of when such damage becomes excessive: such acts are forbidden under 
the general law of armed conflict, which requires attacks to be limited to 
military targets and to be designed to avoid excessive collateral damage to 
the civilian population—an excess measured against the intended military 
advantage.56  
 
D. From Theory to Practice: The Siege and Blockade on the Gaza Strip in Light of 
IHL 
 
What is the military purpose of the land siege and naval blockade on the 
Gaza Strip? Does it justify the collateral damage to the local inhabitants, who 
have been living under these conditions since 2007? Some purposes are man-
ifestly illegitimate and cannot justify a prolonged siege and blockade. These 
include the political purpose of bolstering Fatah (the largest party within the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, which controls the Palestinian Authority 
in the West Bank and is party to the Oslo Accords with Israel) over its Gaza-
ruling rival, Hamas.57 A political purpose cannot justify military actions, 
whose sole ends must be military also. It should be noted that, while Israel 
 
54. This conception developed mainly around Israel’s control beyond the Green Line 
and in view of rulings by Israel’s Supreme Court. See HCJ 393/82 Jama’it Askan Alma’almun 
v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria, 37(4) PD 785, ¶¶ 22, 26–29 (1983) 
(Isr.).  
55. BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 2, at 244–46.  
56. See supra notes 36–42; see also Watts, supra note 29, at 19; OFFICE OF THE GENERAL 
COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 5.20.1 (rev. ed. Dec. 
2016). 











has never acknowledged this as the purpose of the blockade, it can be indi-
rectly inferred.58 
A further illegitimate purpose is to provoke unrest among the civilian 
population to rebel against the local government or to pressurize the latter 
to surrender.59 Such reasoning belongs to a family of justifications that his-
torically supported the bombardment of besieged cities, whether by cata-
pults, artillery, aircraft, or long-range missiles.60 This purpose is illegitimate. 
Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocol I of 1977—mindful of the recent 
“carpet bombings” of World War II—defines military targets very narrowly 
so as to preclude the use of civilian populations to pressure armies.61 The 
laws of siege and blockade are, once again, subject to the same general re-
quirement to distinguish military targets from non-military ones and to avoid 
any damage to the latter. Consequently, a siege or a blockade should be 
avoided altogether unless it is specifically aimed against “military objec-
tives”—that is, “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or 
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or par-
tial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage.”62 Under article 52, no siege or 
blockade should be imposed, especially a prolonged one, if its only aim is to 
harm a civilian population and thereby indirectly pressure combatants 
within.  
One final purpose for an enduring blockade in the Gaza Strip is self-
defense: the desire to prevent Hamas from arming itself in a way that would 
seriously threaten Israel. This purpose is undoubtedly an appropriate military 
one, such that it would even justify inflicting non-excessive collateral damage 
on a civilian population. Still, it raises issues of necessity and proportionality: 
could this purpose be fulfilled through an effective inspection regime, as op-
 
58. Id. ¶ 50.  
59. Sanger, supra note 39, at 402–3 (“The ultimate objective of Israel’s strategy—‘to put 
the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger’—was to encourage the 
people of Gaza to force Hamas to change its attitude toward Israel or alternatively, to force 
Hamas out of government.”).  
60. Watts, supra note 29, at 10–16.  
61. Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 52(2). On this definition, see Kraska, supra note 27, ¶¶ 
1–8; Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AMERI-
CAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 715, 724–25 (2008) (citing the bombing of Dres-
den and the American siege of Manila as events that led to the framing of the principle of 
proportionality).  











posed to sweeping prohibitions or an almost complete stoppage on the pas-
sage of people, goods, services, and capital? This question becomes all the 
more difficult with mounting evidence showing that, despite the prolonged 
blockade, the motivation of the Hamas government and other organizations 
in the Gaza Strip to arm themselves with ever-more-sophisticated weaponry 
and to continue military operations against Israel has not abated. But, at 
some point, when the ability to achieve a military objective becomes ques-
tionable, that objective cannot still be considered necessary or proportional 
and can no longer justify protracted damage to civilian populations.63 Any 
such damage then effectively becomes disproportionate. 
Such questions about the necessity and proportionality of the damage to 
the civilian population caused by limitations on movement—also taking into 
account both land-based and naval elements’ complementarity and accumu-
lative effect over time64—prompt the consideration of every human aspect 
affected by the policy. This exploration must include not merely the physical 
damage to life and body caused, but also mental injury and even the continual 
violation of people’s right to author their own lives.65 Under my proposed 
 
63. See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel et al., 
58(5) PD 807, ¶¶ 36–43 (2004) (Isr.) (the principle of proportionality means that sometimes 
the obligation to protect citizens takes precedence over military necessity); David Luban, 
Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law, 26 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 315, 328–39 (2013) (presenting a similar argument).  
64. Guilfoyle, supra note 39, at 171, 203 (proportionality is considered in context, and 
therefore the proportionality of the naval blockade cannot be considered separately from 
the border crossings’ closure: the effect of the former is worsened by the latter).  
65. One should note that the laws of warfare and of general State responsibility 
acknowledge not merely physical damage (death or bodily harm) to citizens, but also injury 
more generally, including mental anguish. Eliav Lieblich, Beyond Life and Limb: Exploring In-
cidental Mental Harm under International Humanitarian Law, in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES: INTERNATIONAL AND DO-
MESTIC ASPECTS 185 (Derek Jinks et al. eds., 2014). In its commentary on Article 36 of the 
draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the Interna-
tional Law Commission states, 
 
Compensable personal injury encompasses not only associated material losses, such as loss 
of earnings and earning capacity, medical expenses and the like, but also non-material dam-
age suffered by the individual (sometimes, though not universally, referred to as “moral 
damage” in national legal systems). Non-material damage is generally understood to encom-
pass loss of loved ones, pain and suffering as well as the affront to sensibilities associated 













interpretation, the law on prolonged siege and blockade requires the besieging 
and blockading party to allow both family unifications and the passage of 
besieged inhabitants into and out of the blockaded area, to the extent that 
limitations on these activities are not necessary for the fulfillment of the 
blockade’s permissible purpose: the prevention of armament. The longer the 
blockade lasts, the harder it should be for the blockading party to justify 
measures impeding these humane acts.66 
In line with this view, and with typical restraint, the Turkel Commission 
implicitly criticized Israel’s siege and blockade policy, writing the following:  
 
it seems worthwhile to consider the progress that was made around the 
world with regards to targeted or “smart” sanctions. It seems that the Is-
raeli government’s current policy is more in line with those recommenda-
tions; in other words, there should be continued efforts to making the sanc-
tions more focused on the Hamas itself.67 
 
It further cautioned that “[w]ith regard to the duration of the economic war-
fare, . . . there is a danger that comprehensive restrictions on goods may not 
be regarded as proportionate indefinitely.”68 It therefore emphasized “the 
need to maintain a regime of effective supervision and to carry out periodic 
reviews at the highest levels of government with regard to the restrictions 
imposed on the civilian population.”69 
This was written in 2011, following just two years of naval blockade and 
four years of siege, and in reference to relatively narrow views of starvation 
and economic warfare. In these and other respects, the conditions for Gaza 
Strip inhabitants have only worsened since.70 This deterioration reinforces 
the criticism made in the Turkel Report and necessitates a change in the 
blockade regime, in line with the obligation to apply the law of blockade 
according to the principle of proportionality.  
 
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 101, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), 
reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 101, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 
(Part 2).  
66. 1 TURKEL REPORT, supra note 25, ¶¶ 94–95.  
67. Id. ¶ 94.  
68. Id. ¶ 95.  
69. Id. 
70. UNITED NATIONS COUNTRY TEAM IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, 













IV. SIEGE AND BLOCKADE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
A. Application  
 
How are the human rights treaties to which Israel is a party relevant to the 
siege and blockade of Gaza, considering that these actions are acts of war? 
There are those—including in Israel71—who think that in warfare only the 
rules of humanitarian law apply, and that human rights law is entirely irrele-
vant. Two justifications are provided. The first relates to the idea that human 
rights law was not designed to apply in armed conflicts, or rather, that the 
laws of war were intended to cover conflicts as lex specialis.72 The second 
justification focuses on human rights law’s territorial nature, relying on the 
relevant treaties’ application only within areas under a given State’s jurisdic-
tion—that is, under this reasoning, only inside its territorial borders.73  
As is well known, while the first rationale found some initial support in 
the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the legality of nu-
clear weapons,74 a subsequent ruling acknowledged that the two sets of laws 
 
71. State of Israel, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—Second Peri-
odic Report, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2, ¶ 8 (Nov. 20, 2001) (stating that Israel and 
the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are engaged in an armed conflict, and therefore 
human rights law cannot apply concurrently).  
72. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶¶ 24–25 (July 8). This position was adopted by the Turkel Commission. 1 TURKEL 
REPORT, supra note 25, ¶¶ 99–100, 186–67 (the lex specialis that applies is the rules of IHL 
regulating the issue of the naval blockade and the rights of the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, 
including the prohibition against starvation and denial of essential supplies, and the protec-
tion of the right to life). Despite various arguments about the violation of human rights law, 
the Commission concluded that the applicable lex specialis is the rules of IHL. 
73. For the position that human rights law applies wherever a country has effective 
control, including beyond its borders, see Eyal Benvenisti, The Applicability of Human Rights 
Conventions to Israel and to the Occupied Territories, 26 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 24 (1992); Orna Ben-
Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied Territo-
ries, 37 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 17 (2003).  











apply simultaneously, requiring reconciliation between sometimes conflict-
ing norms.75 The Israeli Supreme Court’s ruling on “targeted killings,”76 
which instructed the Israeli army to consider arresting suspected terrorists 
instead of killing them, can be similarly construed.77  
In refusing to formally apply human rights treaties in territories under its 
occupation (and, generally, beyond its borders), Israel is employing the sec-
ond rationale78 This reasoning is not only tenuous—the prevailing opinion 
interprets “jurisdiction” as “effective control,”79 extending the treaties’ ap-
plicability beyond established State borders and encompassing notions of 
transboundary harm—it is completely irrelevant in the case of the land clo-
sure and naval blockade on the Gaza Strip. The closure is being enforced 
 
75. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 102–12 (July 9); see also Hassan v. United King-
dom, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. On the applicability of human rights treaties beyond a coun-
try’s borders, even during armed conflicts, see the HCR’s General Comment No. 31 (human 
rights law applies outside of a State’s territory, even in the absence of military control. A 
State should respect and secure the rights specified in the treaty for any individual within its 
power or effective control, even outside its sovereign territory). See Human Rights Commit-
tee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶¶ 15, 18 (Mar. 29, 
2004); Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99 (the actions of a State per-
formed or producing effects outside its own territory may be deemed “an exercise of au-
thority” and result in the extraterritorial application of human rights law); NOAM LUBELL, 
EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 193–253 (2010) (a re-
view of the law and the different opinions concerning the exterritorial application of human 
rights law in armed conflicts).  
76. HCJ 769/02, The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al. v. The Govern-
ment of Israel et al., 62(1) PD 507 (2005) (Isr.) (official English translation available at: 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\02\690\ 
007\A34&fileName=02007690_A34.txt&type=4).  
77. Id. ¶¶ 18, 40. 
78. Israel’s position may be understood as one of a “persistent objector” to a norm of 
customary international law regarding the meaning of the term “jurisdiction.” A State offer-
ing such persistent objection to customary norms is not bound by it. For more on this, see 
Olufemi Elias, Persistent Objector, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (last updated Sept. 2006), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ 
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1455?rskey=WRRS2f&result=1&prd=MP 
IL. For the customary and prevalent interpretation of “jurisdiction” as “effective control,” 
see supra note 65.  
79. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 











from within Israel’s borders,80 and the naval blockade encompasses vessels 
that are deemed a kind of jurisdiction-carrying “floating territory”81 under 
international law. Both fall within consensus views of the jurisdiction of hu-
man rights law. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, ruled 
that the European Convention on Human Rights extends to Italian ships as 
“floating territories.”82 As such, Italian ships sailing in the open Mediterra-
nean are obligated to save “people in distress at sea” when they encounter 
such incidents. Similarly, Israeli ships are obligated to comply with interna-
tional human rights law when they encounter fishermen seeking a livelihood 
at sea, people attempting to enter the Gaza Strip to unify with their families, 
and those exercising their rights to either enter their homeland or leave it.  
To drive the point home, the commitment that States make under hu-
man rights treaties to preserve, respect, and secure human rights in territories 
“under their effective control” equally applies to people living outside a 
State’s borders when they are affected by actions the State performs inside 
its territory. Thus, for example, a State that allows pollution within its own 
territory and thus violates human rights in a neighboring territory is liable for 
the injury it causes. This principle was recently endorsed by the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights.83 In other words, under this approach toward 
 
80. While the disagreement about the interpretation of “jurisdiction” is relevant to the 
application of human rights treaties in the West Bank under Israel’s belligerent occupation, 
applying these treaties to the blockade on the Gaza Strip is another matter: for the blockade 
itself is imposed and enforced from within Israel’s own sovereign territory (border passages, 
Israeli ships), where no such controversy exists.  
81. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 171 (Sept. 7). See 
Tom Dannenbaum, Encirclement, Deprivation, and Humanity: Revising the San Remo Manual Pro-
visions on Blockade, 97 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 307, 391–92 (2021). 
82. Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 97. See Itamar Mann, Maritime 
Legal Black Holes: Migration and Rightlessness in International Law, 29 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (2018).  
83. The Court ruled the following in an advisory opinion:  
 
The Court considers that States have the obligation to avoid transboundary environmental 
damage that can affect the human rights of individuals outside their territory. For the pur-
poses of the American Convention . . . , it is understood that the persons whose rights have been 
violated are under the jurisdiction of the State of origin, if there is a causal link between the act that originated 
in its territory and the infringement of the human rights of persons outside its territory. 
 
The Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in 
the Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integ-












human rights treaties’ applicability, the emphasis falls on the locus of control: 
where State power is exercised, not where harm accrues. Applying this prin-
ciple to Israel’s blockade is a compelling inference, considering the extensive 
human costs, both direct and indirect, that Israel has levied over so many 
years in the Gaza Strip.  
Two central human rights treaty bodies, the Human Rights Committee 
and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, looked into 
the situation in Gaza on the occasion of considering Israel’s reports. They 
concluded that those treaties did indeed apply to Israel’s policies. Israel did 
not seek to challenge their authority to question its stance. In 2011, Israel’s 
response to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted 
that it allows the passage of Gazan students through its border crossings84 
and that its limitations on fishing on the coastline of the Gaza Strip were 
proportional.85  
I contend that human rights law therefore applies to the siege and block-
ade on the Gaza Strip, both substantially (due to the complementarity be-
tween human rights law and humanitarian law) and territorially (because the 
actions required to impose and enforce the blockade are performed from 
within Israeli territory).  
 
 
Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23, ¶ 101 
(Nov. 15, 2017) (emphasis added). The Court further ruled: 
 
In cases of transboundary damage, the exercise of jurisdiction by a State of origin is based 
on the understanding that it is the State in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction the 
activities were carried out that has the effective control over them and is in a position to 
prevent them from causing transboundary harm that impacts the enjoyment of human 
rights of persons outside its territory. The potential victims of the negative consequences 
of such activities are under the jurisdiction of the State of origin for the purposes of the 
possible responsibility of that State for failing to comply with its obligation to prevent trans-
boundary damage. That said, not every negative impact gives rise to this responsibility. 
 
Id. ¶ 102. See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: On Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018). 
84. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Forty-seventh Session, Sum-
mary Record of the 37th Meeting, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2011/SR.37, at 6–9 (Apr. 11, 2012).  
85. Id. at 5–6. See also Human Rights Committee, List of Issues Prior to Submission of 
the Fifth Periodic Report of Israel, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/QPR/5 (Sept. 7, 2018); Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, List of Issues in Relation to the Fourth 











B. The Scope of Obligations Deriving from International Human Rights Law 
 
Israeli navy ships enforcing the naval blockade engage with Gazan fishermen 
at sea, as well as with Gazans attempting to enter or leave the Gaza Strip.86 
The prevention of entry or exit, or the limitation on fishing causing the loss 
of livelihood, implicate international human rights obligations. Therefore, I 
hold that the blockading party must justify its compliance with applicable 
human rights treaties. 
It is possible to argue that there is a difference between the human rights 
obligations of the blockading force and the obligation of the besieger. A na-
val blockade restricts passage between two territories, both outside a besieg-
ing party’s control. As such, its scope of discretion might be more limited 
than that of the besieging party, which seeks to regulate access to and from 
its own territory: ought not a sovereign have absolute discretion to deny pas-
sage into or out of its own territory, as a homeowner might deny entry to a 
passer-by? Is it conceivable that human rights law would curtail or limit this 
sovereign right? 
The answer is no: there is no such absolute sovereign discretion. First, 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, to which Israel is party, imposes certain obli-
gations on member States—most relevantly, that of non-refoulement.87 The 
convention defines the status of “refugee” very strictly, as one who, 
  
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, 
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habit-
ual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it.88 
  
 
86. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 12, 23, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIALS 368 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. See 
Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, ¶¶ 63–67 (Mar. 29, 2010) (ECtHR), http://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97979 (the European Court of Human Rights ruled that, when 
a French frigate intercepted a vessel in international waters, once it established “full and 
exclusive control,” the European Convention on Human Rights would apply). 
87. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S 
137. 











There are reasonable grounds for arguing that political opponents of Hamas, 
who are persecuted by it, those who have been harmed by Hamas, and those 
persecuted in their community (for their sexual orientation, for instance) 
should be entitled to the status of refugee. Difficult questions about the ful-
fillment of obligations by a sovereign State involved in armed conflict and 
about a State’s duty to actively allow persecuted refugees to exit—for exam-
ple by keeping border passages open for refugees—arise in this scenario. 
Suffice to say, Israel is obliged to offer asylum to refugees who are able to 
contact its soldiers at sea or on land or else cross the border.89  
More important and more comprehensive still are the obligations placed 
upon the besieging State by general human rights law, and particularly by the 
international covenants on civil and political rights, and economic, social, 
and cultural rights.90 These duties prohibit States from removing people to a 
foreign territory where they might face torture or be subjected to inhuman 
or degrading treatment;91 this prohibition on torture is considered jus cogens 
 
89. The 1951 Convention applies to Palestinians fleeing from Gaza. Case No. C-
364/11, Mostafa Abed El Karem El Kott and Others v. Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági 
Hivatal, ECLI:EU:C:2012:826, ¶ 63 (Dec. 19, 2012). On the principle of non-refoulement, 
see Yaffa Zilbershats, Freedom of Movement: on Entering States, Remaining in Them and Leaving 
Them, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 305, 312–5 (Robbie Sabel & Yaël Ronen eds, 3d rev. ed. 
2016) (Hebrew) (describing the principle and noting that, even under the qualification that 
the State is not obliged to offer asylum, it must at least ensure that a person have a safe 
haven where their life and freedom are not threatened. Zilbershats further notes Article 3 
in the United Nations Convention against Torture, which forbids returning a person to a 
State where they might be in danger of being subjected to torture). The same principle ap-
plies under Israeli constitutional law. See HCJ 4702/94 Kadem al Tai et al. v. The Minster 
of the Interior et al., 49(3) PD 843, 848–89 (1995) (Isr.) (concerning Iraqi citizens who had 
infiltrated into Israel seeking asylum, Justice Barak ruled that the Minister of Interior’s de-
portation powers should only be exercised in light of the value of the human being, the 
sanctity of human life, and the principle of freedom, and therefore should not be exercised 
if deportation might threaten a person’s life or freedom; and that, prior to deportation, the 
Minister must ensure that the destination country meets the necessary conditions for guar-
anteeing the deported person’s human rights and that they are protected against torture). 
But, in the case of the Gaza Strip, the (controversial) “safe third country” exception to the 
non-refoulement principle is, at any rate, irrelevant. See AdminA 8101/15 Tsagata v. Minis-
ter of Interior, ¶¶ 37–39 (Aug. 28, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (Isr.) (the Prevention of 
Infiltration Law, in adopting the model of removal to a third country, does not contradict 
the principle of non-refoulement, as long as said removal is made to a safe third country).  
90. ICCPR, supra note 86; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
91. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 












under international law.92 My argument, then, goes as follows: if a State 
should grant asylum to a person subjected to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment in a foreign territory by a foreign government, then it should certainly 
provide refuge to persons suffering degrading conditions in a foreign terri-
tory that it created in the first place, even where these conditions were insti-
gated “abroad” from inside the besieging or blockading State’s own territory 
(or by using its vessels at sea). Accordingly, if a State prevents escape from a 
neighboring region, then it should, at the very least, avoid further violation 
of the rights of its inhabitants and refrain from creating degrading conditions 
therein. In the case of the Gaza Strip, therefore, I argue that human rights 
law requires Israel to not withhold asylum from inhabitants who are subject 
to the inhuman and degrading realities caused by its own blockade. As a 
minimum, then, it should avoid creating this reality through siege and block-
ade.  
Several core obligations of the State at its border crossings are also rele-
vant, which include rights directly violated by the blockade’s enforcement: 
the right of passage as it pertains to receiving an education93 or life-saving 
medical treatment,94 the right to family life (family unification),95 and the 
general freedom of movement.96  
As noted by the Turkel Commission,97 the obligations owed by the 
blockading party are subject to security needs and various other considera-
tions; however, framing the situation as one raising human rights issues 
 
Comment No. 20: On Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994); A.R.J. v. Australia, Human Rights Com-
mittee, No. 629/1996, ¶ 6.9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996 (Aug. 11, 1997). 
92. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/74/10, ch. V, § C (Conclusion 23), annex, 146–47 (2019).  
93. HCJ 5373/08 Abu Libdeh v. Minister of Education, ¶¶ 24–25 (Feb. 6, 2011), Nevo 
Legal Database (Isr.). 
94. HCJ 5693/18 Al Mezan Center for Human Rights v. Prime Minister of Israel et al., 
¶¶ 15, 22–23, 29 (Aug. 26, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (Isr.). See also id. separate opinion, ¶ 
1, by Amit, J. & Grosskopf, J. 
95. See HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v Minister of Interior, 53(2) PD 728 ¶ 73 (2004) (Isr.). 
96. Zilbershats, supra note 89, at 327–30.  
97. THE PUBLIC COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 
2010, SECOND REPORT – THE TURKEL COMMISSION: ISRAEL’S MECHANISMS FOR EXAM-
INING AND INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS AND CLAIMS OF VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF 












transfers the burden of proof. It is now the blockading country that must 
establish that the siege and blockade are both necessary and proportional, 
from the perspective of the actual and potential human rights violations their 




In this article, I argue that prolonged siege and blockade subjects the block-
ading party to a more broadly interpreted set of obligations owed to the local 
population that it cuts off from the world. These obligations are rooted in 
IHL, as well as in human rights law, and are not limited to those basic pro-
hibitions examined by the Turkel Commission against starving the local pop-
ulation or denying it of its full water supply. A besieging party must also 
allow the passage of inhabitants into and out of the blockaded area, as well 
as into and out of its own territory, to secure various human rights. Specifi-
cally, it must avoid using its own territory to produce inhuman and degrading 
conditions even beyond its borders. And a siege and blockade imposed in-
definitely produce just that: they ignore basic human needs and reduce hu-
man life to food and water consumption alone.  
Reducing human life to this most basic level does not live up to the 
standard set by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which honors 
the dignity of besieged people as human beings “endowed with reason and 
conscience.”98 The Declaration, as well as the many human rights treaties 
that followed in its wake, conveys a commitment by the global human rights 
regime toward protecting every person’s potential to live fully as a human 
being, well beyond ensuring the receipt of basic provisions. Denying such 
additional needs amounts to denial of a person’s humanity, and this, in itself, 
is inhuman and degrading treatment. It is at odds with the essential dignity 
of every human being, a principle that stands at the root of the international 
legal acknowledgment of human rights, of which the laws of war are but a 
lex specialis.  
When the Turkel Commission examined Israel’s policy regarding the 
Gaza Strip according to the laws of siege and blockade in their strictest sense, 
it minimized and focused the legal problem to the vital but narrow issues of 
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ever, international human rights law concedes that in times of emergency it is possible to 
derogate from certain other rights in the face of genuine security needs”). 











starvation and fulfillment of basic living needs. It is understandable, there-
fore, that human rights organizations and legal scholars should turn to the 
law of occupation to expand the discussion and evaluate the entire range of 
limitations caused by the closures. However, reviewing the blockade under 
the law of occupation obscures the difference between those who directly 
control a territory and those who impose a blockade from outside, and mud-
dies the respective scope of responsibility: it is far from obvious that the 
occupier should allow the local inhabitants to enter or exit the territory it 
controls. Looking at Israel’s policy concerning the Gaza Strip through the 
legal lens of prolonged siege and blockade and human rights law shines a light 
on the responsibility of the besieging party for decisions it makes within its 
own territory and implements on its own land or through its navy. While it 
may be the case that the siege and blockade of Gaza were prompted by mil-
itary necessity, they result in pressure on the civilian population that is argu-
ably excessive. Proportionality, by its nature, encompasses such conditions 
and demands that consideration be given to the effect of a given military 
action on all aspects of a civilian’s life.  
Indeed, the requirement of proportionality in siege conditions, as con-
veyed in Deuteronomy, is based on an appreciation of human nature: “When 
thou shalt besiege a city . . . thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof . . . for 
the tree of the field is man’s life.” Grotius grounds his own requirement for 
proportionality in battle in this same precept, emphasizing the need to spare 
“every thing necessary for the support of man.”99 Under siege and blockade 
conditions that have prevailed for years and are not intended to expire any 
time soon, “the support of man” should equate to more than a fixed daily 
calorie quota. 
 
99. GROTIUS, supra note 42, bk. III, ch. XII. 
